| Bombardment of Cherbourg | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of World War II, Operation Neptune-Overlord | |||||||
A heavy German coast artillery shell falls between USS Texas and Arkansas while they were dueling "Battery Hamburg" |
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| Belligerents | |||||||
| United States United Kingdom |
Germany | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Morton Deyo | Karl Schlieben | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 3 battleships 2 heavy cruisers 2 light cruisers 11 destroyers 3 minesweeper squadrons |
20 casemated batteries Battery Hamburg German "Fortress" status elements of 4 divisions |
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The Bombardment of Cherbourg was undertaken by ships of the United States Navy and Royal Navy on June 25, 1944 to support United States Army units engaged in the Battle of Cherbourg. The Allied force attacked the German fortifications near the city and engaged in a duel with coastal batteries. While all but one of the allied ships suffered damage, and few shells hit the German batteries, the bombardment influenced the German commander's decision to surrender the next day.
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The 1st U.S. Army, VII U.S. Army Corps, was to capture Cherbourg, the major port facility in Normandy. On Jun 25, 1944, a bombarding force (CTF 129), was organized under the Command of Rear-Admiral Morton Deyo, USN to support their advance over the Cotentin Peninsula and assault on the German fortifications.[1]
COMBINED TASK FORCE 129: Rear Admiral Dayo, Commander, U.S.S. Tuscaloosa, flag, U.S.S. Texas, U.S.S. Arkansas , U.S.S. Quincy, U.S.S. Nevada, U.S.S. Laffey, U.S.S. Barton, U.S.S. Obrien, H.M. Glasgow, H.M. Enterprise
Minesweeping: British 9th Minesweeping Flotilla, British 159th Minesweeping Flotilla, U.S. 7th Minesweeping Squadron
Anti-submarine screen: H.M. Onslow, H.M. Offa, H.M. Onslaught, H.M. Oribi, H.M. Melbreak, H.M. Brissenden[2]
Once the Allied assault at Normandy was assessed as the primary invasion, German commanders sought to limit the lodgment preparatory to a counter offensive. To preserve naval assets, the Cherbourg-based German (electric) E-boats were transferred to Saint-Malo. Four destroyers out of Brest tried to make for Cherbourg to follow the E-boats, but they were sunk or disabled. The next German step was to deny the Allies use of the major port facility on the Cotentin Peninsula. By 14 June the Germans had begun to block, mine and demolish Cherbourg’s harbor. The violent English Channel storm that thrashed apart the artificial port Mulberry A raged until June 22. While logistic movement ashore was temporarily crippled, their sustainability was in doubt. Cherbourg was the nearest major port, the Allies desperately needed it in their possession.[3]
From 18 June, the Cotentin Peninsula was sealed off by Allied infantry but the German line engaging the Americans was stabilized, the American advance stalled. Cherbourg held an additional 40,000 garrison under command of Generalleutnant Karl von Schlieben. Hitler believed that without Cherbourg, the Allied invasion would fail. He ordered Cherbourg to be made impregnable, awarding it “fortress” status. The American ground forces would lose over 2800 dead and 13,500 wounded to conquer it.[4]
Rear Admiral Morton Deyo began putting together a plan of naval bombardment on 15 June. In ten days, he would orchestrate a “Sunday punch” of notably ferocious naval gunnery. The objective in and around Cherbourg was armed with coastal guns in 20 casemated batteries, 15 of them 150-mm or greater, three of 280-mm. There were many 75-mm and the feared 88-mm guns, some which could be trained inland on advancing infantry, as well as seaward. While planning went forward, the late June storm raging into the English Channel scattered Deyo’s task force out to open sea and into British ports. It then reassembled in Portland, England. On the Cotentin Peninsula, the U.S. Army VII Corps advance after some progress, was again stalled before entrenched German resistance.[4]
The proposed naval bombardment was complicated because advance of the 9th, 79th and 4th Divisions had brought them within a mile of the city. An army liaison officer was assigned as General "Lightning Joe" Collins' (VII Corps) representative aboard the Tuscaloosa to expedite communications between different services and commands. The navy-only operation with a three-hour bombardment was shortened to 90 minutes. The only targets to fire at had to be limited to those chosen by the Army.[4]
The task force was divided into two divisions, Deyo’s Group one was assigned Cherbourg, inner harbor forts and west towards the Atlantic. Group 1 was Tuscaloosa, Quincy, Nevada, HMS Glasgow and five destroyers: Ellyson(flag), Hambleton, Rodman, Emmons, Murphy, and Gherardi.[5]
Admiral C. F. Bryant’s smaller Group 2 was to take “Target 2”, the "Battery Hamburg". It was located near Fermanville, inland from Cape Levi, six miles east of Cherbourg. Nevada in Group 1 was to use its major battery to silence “the most powerful German strongpoint on the Cotentin Peninsula.”[6] Then Group 2 would complete the destruction, and pass westward to join Deyo’s Group. Bryant’s Group 2 was composed of aging Texas, Arkansas, and five destroyers.[7] These were Barton (flag), O'Brien, Laffey, Hobson (pennant), and Plunket.[8]
Minesweeping Squadron 7 and British 9th Minesweeping Flotilla were to swept lanes ahead of them. General "Pete" Quesada of IX Army Air Force provided fighter cover. Additional aircraft provided antisubmarine patrols and combat air patrol. All planned long-range shots on seaward batteries were cancelled, and only call fires were to be delivered. Inter-service negotiations made three batteries dedicated Navy targets, and added any batteries firing on the ships. The ships were to have spotter planes over Cherbourg targets. During ship approaches from 0940 until 1200 they were to fire only if fired on.[7]
NEPTUNE standard operating procedure for “Shore Fire Control Parties” (S.F.C.P.) called for nine per infantry division. A Naval gunfire liaison officer was attached to each regimental fire control center. A Naval gunfire officer was attached to each divisional headquarters in charge of all shore parties in his division.[9]
Every firing ship was to be provided with an army artillery officer to maintain current information about the position of allied troops, and to determine whether to fire at any given target at the time. The Army liaison officer decided the safety of firing at each target. “The ship itself controlled the fire.” The SFCP observed the fall of shot and corrected fire with a clock code.[10] “In all cases, it was the responsibility of the ship to determine whether any given shoot would endanger allied personnel or positions.” This was possible because each bombarding ship was provided with an Army officer who tracked positions of allied forces ashore.[10]
Air spotters operated in pairs, one as a spotter, one as an escort, each capable of both missions. Each pair could communicate with one another and with the same ships. Every bombarding ship was provided radio capability to communicate with all varieties of aircraft radios. The third method of fire control involved a combination of air to ground to sea communication. “Army Air Observation” planes spotted for a control party on the ground. They relayed the information to the ships taking fire missions.[10][11]
At 0940, Group 1 made landfall, about 15 miles north of Cherbourg. Leading minesweepers cleared approach channels for both battle groups, Group 2’s column steaming parallel several miles to the east. They arrived into the seaward Fire Support Areas without being fired on or receiving any calls for fire. As noon passed at eight bells, the Task Force plodded towards the in-shore fire support areas at the sweepers’ 5-knot speed. German salvos from a village three miles west of Cherbourg at Querqueville began falling among the deployed minesweeper flotillas. Four British Fairmile destroyer-escorts began making a smoke screen for the approaching minesweepers. H.S. Glasgow and H.S. Enterprise with Spitfire spotters began returning fire on the German batteries firing on the minesweepers. In just 30 minutes, every minesweeper had been straddled with battery fire, though none were hit. Deyo recalled them, and they would lay-to out of range for the rest of the action.[12]
At 0955, Bryant’s Group 2 entered Fire Support Area 2,. Spotter planes for Texas and Arkansas were on target, ready to open fire, and operations plan called for Nevada to begin firing on Target 2, "Battery Hamburg". Deyo’s flash message surprised Bryant cancelling Nevada’s long-range bombardment, postponing his open-firing until noon at shore request or in self-defense, and Group 2 was to join Group 1 by noon[13]
American troops had overrun two smaller targets, spotters described them as “surrounded by dead Germans”. The strong currents off Normandy slowed the battleships behind minesweepers drifting off course in the current. Arkansas established radio contact with its shore fire control party, closed range to 18,000 yards and opened fire on Battery Hamburg with her antiquated fire control system.[14] Texas could not connect with her shore party, so stayed in line with the minesweepers.[15]
Arkansas salvos did no damage, so as Group 2 steamed well into the battery arc of fire, the German guns were able to let fly. The sweepers were all bracketed. Destroyer Barton was holed with a ricochet dud from another battery that landed in her after diesel room. She returned fire on the disclosed battery without air or shore spot. All sweepers were splashed with near misses. Destroyer Laffey took a dud in her port bow by the anchor. The damage control party pried it loose and overboard.[15]
Group 2 now began firing generally at "Battery Hamburg", which was then obscured by smoke. Texas was straddled by three rounds at her bow, swung starboard with full right rudder, and missed three shells over her stern. Maneuvering, she was straddled at intervals of 20–30 seconds by a newly uncovered battery just northeast of "Battery Hamburg". The large battery itself was focusing on minesweepers and destroyers. Destroyer O’Brien was hit at her bridge, knocking out her radar, so sailed out to sea through a smoke screen blind. Minesweepers and the three damaged destroyers were recalled, the destroyers firing their 5-inch guns as harassing fire until out of range.[15]
At 1220, Group 1 destroyers laid smoke to protect the heavy ships in Fire Support Area No. 3, then closed nearer the shore to gain more effective fire on the Querqueville battery. German fire concentrated on H.M.S. Glasgow and Enterprise, hitting Glasgow twice, but she was able to rejoin. After two hours of dueling, all four German guns were temporarily neutralized. Air spot followed the operations at the landing beaches. Pairs of Spitfires, including pilots off the heavy ships, were to loiter 45 minutes over target. Only half were able to reach the area, the others were driven off by flak, turned away with engine trouble, or could not navigate to the target assignment.[12]
At 1212, the first call for fire came in from VII Corps shore fire control parties. Following their corrections, Nevada and Quincy took out the fortified target in 25 minutes. They continued with targets of opportunity for about three hours. Tuscaloosa was distributing its fire among targeted strong points directed by shore fire control, when flak hit its two Spitfires and they were forced to retire. In the first hour, Ellyson identified coastal battery fire nearby the town of Gruchy. Glasgow and her air spot silenced it with 54 rounds.[12] Destroyer Emmons answered the fire on Fort De l’Est on one of the harbor breakwaters, but by the time the target was silenced, a well camouflaged battery began walking fire closer to the ship operating from a range of 15,000 yards. Rodman dropped smoke, and Emmons withdrew.[12]
At 1320, ten minutes before the agreed to ending of the Bombardment of Cherbourg, Admiral Deyo, seeing that the mission was not accomplished, signaled VII Corps, ”Do you wish more gunfire? Several enemy batteries still active.” The Querqueville battery had come to life again and taken the Murphy under fire, straddling it four times in 20 minutes. Tuscaloosa came to her aid, scoring a direct hit bringing flames. Her deck covered with splinters and splashes from near misses, Murphy dodged behind a smoke screen. Ellyson and Gherardi joined in. Quincy fired for half an hour, then the Nevada silenced the battery again. Later as the task force withdrew the battery opened fire again. More than its endurance, the task force upper decks noted its long day of near-misses. The battery near Gruchy came to life again. H.M.S. Glasgow and Rodman returned fire. The batteries in and around Cherbourg seemed to be able to fire accurately at any ship within 15,000 yards. Rodman pulled out of range.[12]
Navy men had been assigned to Army units as shore party spotters to direct all fire more than 2,000 yard inland. The infantry support fires could then safely reach along roads far inland, blowing Nazi tank squads into “scrap”. Pillboxes were “powdered”, gun emplacements “tossed skyhigh”. German shore batteries were in turn laying well place fire churning the seas with near misses bracketing Deyo’s ships.[16]
In Group 2, making westward to join Group 1, Texas was radically steering to dodge near-misses and straddles, one of the German 280-mm shells struck the hull and lodged alongside a sailor's bunk, but it too was a dud. At 1335, one of the large caliber guns in Battery Hamburg was knocked out by Texas, and she and Arkansas continued through the afternoon firing at "Battery Hamburg" and a nearby battery. When they strayed back into the arc of fire, "Battery Hamburg"’s three remaining guns made Texas a target, and a nearby 105-mm battery acquired Arkansas. Both ships maneuvered, the two remaining destroyers made smoke, and all escaped with no damage.[15]
At 1402 VII Corps replied to Deyo, “Thanks very much – we should be grateful if you would continue until 1500.” VII Corps was on the verge of breaking into Cherbourg’s city streets. Fort des Flamand at the eastern end of the inner breakwater, had eight dual-purpose 88-mm guns holding up a regiment of the 4th division. Shore fire control called for naval support, and Hambleton began firing, but large-caliber rounds from "Battery Hamburg" began to drop around her at 14,250 yards. She retired, then Quincy was able to silence the target fort. Nevada turned from "Battery Hamburg" and joined in attacking targets on the west side of Cherbourg which might turn landward on advancing infantry. For over twenty minutes she was repeatedly straddled, including two that holed her superstructure, and another that missed as close as 25 feet.[12]
An hour later, following General Collin’s new deadline of 1500, Admiral Deyo ordered cease fire and began withdrawal from the bombardment area. Group 2 headed back to Portland, England, at 1501.[15] Flagship Tuscaloosa took another call for fire. The target was 75-mm field guns in casemates, on the dock at the entrance to Cherbourg's naval arsenal. Tuscaloosa continued firing as she maneuvered out to sea, at 25,000 yards and again out a further mile and a half with accuracy.[12]
General Collins wrote to Admiral Deyo on 29 June, “Naval bombardment of the coastal batteries and the covering strong points around Cherbourg … results were excellent, and did much to engage the enemy’s fire while our troops stormed into Cherbourg from the rear.” The Army liaison officer reported after inspection of the port defenses that guns after bombardment could not be reactivated, and those which could have been turned landward were still pointed out to sea when the city fell.[17]
While prisoner reports speak of terror from naval gunnery, “there is no evidence that naval gun fire caused great destruction to enemy guns. Naval gunfire neutralized rather than destroyed enemy batteries.” Long periods of silence from German gun positions was considered the result of the moral impact on their gunners, not destructive effect on the guns. Infantry capturing German batteries is what eliminates their threat. “All Navy and Army reports on the subject agree that the most effective naval gunnery is small ship direct fire support of infantry.[18]
The volume of fire was notable and of consequence. Supreme Commander Eisenhower wrote, “The final assault was materially assisted by heavy and accurate naval gunfire.” Commander of Cherbourg, General von Schlieben reported to Feldmarschall Rommel, that further resistance had been useless due in part to “heavy fire from the sea.” Admiral Krancke recorded for his war diary, that one contributing cause to Cherbourg’s fall was “naval bombardment of a hitherto unequalled fierceness.” [17]
German reports of the effect of Naval bombardment was broadcast over the German telegraph service in the “German Military Journal”. The Allied naval fire curtain was one of their trump cards. In a crisis, it was better aimed and it could be sustained on target. The functions of the artillery arm are provided by the combined fleet. Even “smaller vessels” have firepower that cannot be underestimated: “a torpedo boat … had the firepower of a howitzer battery, a destroyer that of a Battery of Artillery.” A cruiser is compared to a regiment of artillery. Battleships of 38-40-cm guns have no equal in land warfare, possible only “by an unusual concentration of very heavy batteries.”[18]
The German report said that the Allied troops had a “particular advantage” from ship formations which had mobility to achieve artillery concentrations at any point on the battlefield, and then change their placement to wherever the fighting required it. The Anglo-American naval forces have made “the best possible use of this opportunity.” A single coastal battery would come repeatedly under “quite extraordinary superior fire-power”. A multiple type formation of warships would concentrate their fire at batteries when they were the focal point of combat, creating an “umbrella of fire (Feuerglocks)”.[18] Field-Marshal von Rundstedt assessed Allied naval gun fire support as “The flexible and well directed support of the land troops … ranging from battleship to gun boat … as quickly mobile, constantly available artillery, at points … as defense against our [German] attacks or as support for [Allied] attacks.” They are skillfully directed by air and ground spotters. Their naval gunnery has a high rapid-fire capacity at range.[18]
Nevertheless, World War II U.S. naval doctrine was modified. More attention was paid to the requirement of long range effective fire. Had not so many of the German shells been duds, Admiral Bertram Ramsay, Naval Commander in Chief of the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force observed, “they might well have inflicted heavy damage to our ships at the relatively close range ...” Before June 1944, the United States Navy had experience in both the Mediterranean and the Pacific. It pointed to a conclusion that the upgraded modern fire control systems on U.S. ships allowed for them to close with and defeat coastal batteries at will. But in the Mediterranean the shore batteries had not been “well and resolutely” served. Japanese coast defense gunners were inadequately trained. Morison’s conclusion was that, Even with modern directors for naval gunnery, a casemated gun is “exceedingly difficult for a rapidly maneuvering warship to destroy with a direct hit, although a shower of salvos around the coast defense position will silence the guns temporarily.”[17]
Admiral Deyo’s after action report recommended that long-range bombardment with plane spot would be required to silence casemated batteries. Either good air spot or shore parties are required for effective naval bombardment, especially when strong currents add to the navigational problems of a task force under accurate shore battery fire.[16]
Task Force 129 had ten destroyers listed in its assigned ships from five divisions, DESDIV 19, 20, 34, 119, 13, out of four squadrons, DESRON 10, 17, 60, 7. Additional destroyers noted below were among those which rendered fire support to the VII Corps in their drive up the Cotentin Peninsula. They also bombarded coastal batteries nearby Cherbourg within the three days prior to Task Force 129. An accounting of where the other ships in a division were and why they could not be there, can show a glimpse of the chaos and loss of war, even amidst a “success”. The discussion in this section is based on the squadron organization, destroyer class descriptions, and ships histories found at the Destroyer History Foundation webpage[19] and the Navy’s “Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships” online.[20]
In the World War II U.S. Navy destroyer organization, a captain commanded a destroyer squadron (DESRON) composed of two divisions. Destroyer division (DESDIV) composition could change rapidly and divisions did not always operate together. Ships composing divisions are listed in hull-number order. Other sources may order ships in a division by the seniority of their commanders. The “commodore” of a squadron flies his “flag” from his flagship. The division commander flies his “pennant”. The commanders carried their flags with them when they moved from ship to ship. If the flag in a division is unknown for 25 June 1944, it is left attached to the lowest hull number.
Ships with one asterisk have recently seen extraordinary service, machinery breaks down, men need rest in port; they are given alternative screen and escort duty. Ships with two asterisks are lost or under repair, see notes. Task Force 129 included the ten destroyers noted in bold. Ships with (flag) or (pennant) in the task force would have had an additional senior officer with seamanship, command and combat experience on the bridge during action.
DESRON 10 (I). After Bristol, the nine low-numbered 1,630-tonners (Bristol class). This was the first squadron of fiscal year 1941 ships commissioned. Another citation records that 1,630-ton Gleaves-class ships were assigned to squadrons 10–19. This is not to be confused with the late-war re-establishment of DESRON 10 (II) of 2,200-ton destroyers, which was made up of either of the short hull (Sumner-class) or long hull (Gearing-class) destroyers.
DESRON 17. 1,630-ton Gleaves-class ships were assigned to squadrons 10–19.
DESRON 60 The first five Sumner class 2,200-tonners from Bath and the first four from Federal, beginning with Squadron 60, each with two divisions.
DESRON 7 made up of the eight ships authorized in fiscal year 1938 plus Plunkett. The squadron had a history from September 1920, composed of 15 flush-deckers of 1,200 tons in Charleson, SC, reactivated in April 1939 at San Diego. 1940, Gleaves and Benson class 1,630 ton destroyers replaced the old to form an 11 ship squadron.
Task Force 129, Group One (incomplete)
USS Tuscaloosa (CA-37), , Adm. Dayo flag, commanding, USS Quincy (CA-71), Baltimore-class cruiser, USS Nevada (BB-36), Nevada-class battleship
HMS Glasgow (C21), Southampton-class light cruiser , HMS Enterprise (D52), Emerald-class light cruiser
USS Ellyson (DD-454) (desron flag), Gleaves-class destroyer, USS Rodman (DD-456), USS Gherardi (DD-637), USS Hambleton (DD-455), USS Emmons (DD-457)
HMS Sidmouth (J47) Group 1 lead minesweeper, HMS Bangor (J00) Bangor-class minesweeper
Task Force 129, Group Two (incomplete)
USS Texas (BB-35) , New York-class battleship, Adm. Bryant flag, USS Arkansas (BB-33), Wyoming class battleship
USS Barton (DD-722) (desron flag), USS O'Brien (DD-725), USS Laffey (DD-724), Allen M. Sumner-class destroyer, USS Hobson (DD-464) (desdiv pennant), USS Plunkett (DD-431)
USS Swift (AM-122), Auk class minesweeper, USS Auk (AM-57), USS Broadbill (AM-58), USS Nuthatch (AM-60), USS Pheasant (AM-61)
Anti-submarine screen
HMS Onslow (G17), O-class destroyer, HMS Offa (G29), HMS Onslaught (G04), HMS Oribi (G66), HMS Melbreak, Hunt-class destroyer, Type III, HMS Brissenden, Hunt-class destroyer Type IV